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In the mid—1970s the Bank of Canada, along with a number
of other central banks, began to set explicit targets for monetary growth
and to emphasize the long—run role of monetary aggregates in controlling
the rapid upward trend of prices.
There are three distinct ways of viewing and interpreting
a policy of setting growth targets for monetary aggregates. The first
is associated with the work of William Poole, the second is derived from
the reduced—form model initially developed at the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, and the third, which the author has labelled the feedback—
rule approach, is related to the techniques developed within central banks
to implement the policy of monetary targeting. In this paper the author
sets forth the logic and examines the implications of these three methods
when the principal aim of policy is reducing the rate of inflation. He
also examines the question of gradualist versus Tlcold_showerht policies
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In the mid—1970s the Bank of Canada, along with a number
of other central banks, began to set explicit targets for
monetary qrowth and to emphasize the lonq—run role of monetary
aggregates in controlling the rapid upward trend of prices.
The central banks were respcnding in large measure to a change
in the environment in which economic policies were being
formulated. Whereas for most of the postwar period policy had
been concerned with unemployment and stabilization of the
cycle, events of the late 1960s and early 1970s had brought
inflation to the fore as the main economic challenge. The
change in policy thrust was backed up by a great deal of
theoretical and empirical work that provided both the
rationale for the new policies and the confidence that they
could be applied in a sensible fashion.1
In examining the research underlying the policy of
setting monetary targets one finds three distinct ways of
viewing and interpretinq the rationale of such a policy. The
first is associated with the work of Poole, the second is
derived from the reduced—form model initially developed at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and the third, which I have
1. For a discussion of the Canadian approach to policy in
the 1970s see Freeman (1978), Bank of Canada (1975, 1976,
1977, 1978, 1979), Courchene (1976, 1977), and the
symposium on monetary policy in Canada in the November
1979 issue of the Canadian Journal of Economics by
Courchene, Fortin, Sparks and White (1979). A brief
overview of the U.S. approach to policy can be found in
Friedman (1977a).labelled the feedback—rule approach, is related to the
techniques developed within central banks to implement the
policy of monetary targeting. In this paper I set forth the
logic and examine the implications of each of the approaches
when the principal aim of policy is reducing the rate of
inflation. Although the issues discussed will reflect the
kinds of problems that have arisen in Canada in the mid— to
late—1970s, the focus of the analysis will be theoretical; I
will not attempt to assess the actual events and policies of
this period.
I begin inSection2 with the simple IS—LM model of the
static economy that underlies at least some of the academic
discussion of a monetary aggregates policy. Although useful
as an expository device for introducing the three ways of
interpreting an aqqregates policy, this model has very severe
limitations inthatit does not allow for the existence of
inflatinn. In Section 3 of the paper I therefore extend the
model to include an augmented Phillips curve and inflationary
expectations. Although still relatively simple and easy to
manipulate, the extended model is sufficiently rich to allow
us to derive the implications for output, unemployment,
inflation rates and interest rates of a policy of gradual
deceleration over time of monetary growth. Both theory and
the results of simulating various empirical models are used in
the analysis to investigate the nature of the time paths that
arise from such an anti—inflationary policy.—3—
Next, this model is used to analyze the three different
ways of interpreting monetary aggregates in the contextof an
inflationary setting.I also examine the question of
gradualist versus "cold—shower" policies and, in Section 4,
suggest criteria for selecting the appropriate monetary
aggregate. Although the model and the discussion assume a
closed economy, the extension to an open economy with flexible
exchange rates will be referred to in passing and in
footnotes. 2
2.The important operational question of whether the central
bank uses base control or interest rate control as its
mechanism for affecting the growth of the monetary
agqreqate will not be addressed in this paper. See
Freedman (1981) for an analysis of some of the
implications of using the monetary base or bank reserves
to control a monetary aggregate.2 MONETARY POLICY IN A SIMPLE NON-INFLATIONARY MODEL
To date, research on the use of monetary aggregate
targets as control mechanisT h'iS followed three main routes
of inquiry. These can be t:ue Poole approach, the
reduced—formapproach,andi: edhack—ruleapproach. To
analyze these approaches 1:Stnssection a simple model
without inflation; inthene:section the samethree
approacheswill he anayze:te contexto a somewhat more
complexmodel with inflation.
2.1The Model
Begin withthe followitiq standard IS—LM model of a
non—inflationary economy:
lnY(t)=a(t)-bR(tI (1)
lnM(t)=c—dR(t)+ elnY(t) + v(t). (2)
All coefficients throughout tee paper are postulated to be
positive, Equation (1), the IS curve, relates nominal income
(Y), which is equivalent torealoutput in a world without
inflation, to government expenditure (included in a(t)),
nominal interest rates (R) and a non—observable random
variable term (u). A non'-ioqai-ithmic equation of this type
can easily be derived from a simple Keynesian—style model of
commodity demand with a consumption function, an investment
function (with investment inversely related to the interest
rate) and an income equilibrium condition in which income—6—
equals the sum of consumption, investment, and government
expenditure. Since there is no inflation in the model, no
distinction needs to be made between nominal and real rates of
interest in the determination of real output. Equation (2)
equates the supply of money CM) with the demand for money,
which is a function of income, interest rates and a
non—observable random variable (v). The demand for money can
be derived from either a transaction approach as analyzed
originally by Baumol (1952) and Tohin (1956) or a
choice—theoretic approach as exposited by Friedman (1959).
Equations (1) and (2) are the structural equations of the
IS—LM framework. If the exogenous variables of the system are
money and government expenditure then the reduced—form
equations express Y and R as functions of a and M.
lnY(t) = [da(t)-bc+blnM(t)-bv(t)+du(t)} (3)
R(L) =d+be[ea(t) +c-lnM(t)v(t)+eu(t)]. (4)
Alternatively, if the exogenous variables are interest rates
and government expenditures, then the reduced—form equations
express Y and M as functions of a and R:
lnY(t) =a(t)—bR(t)+u(t) (5)
lnM(t) =c+ea(t)—(d+be)R(t)+eu(t)+v(t). (6)
3. For an up—to—date survey of money demand equations see
Laidler (1977).—7—
Before proceeding to analyze this static IS—LM system, I
set out the equations for a system with an identical economic
structure in which the effect on left—hand--side variables of a
change in right—hand-side variables occurs with a distributed
lag. This system will prove useful later in the analysis.
The easiest way to represent and solve such a system is via
the use of lag operator notation.4 In this notation,
LkX =X(t-k)
B(L)R =(B0L° + B1L'+B2L2+... + BL)R
B0R(t) +B1R(t-1)+B2R(t-2)+... + BR(t-n)-
Thesum of the coefficients in the distributed lag is
represented by
B(l) B0l° +B111+B212+... + BJ
=B0+B1 +B2 +... +B.




The reduced—form equations in which M and a are treated as
exogenous variables are shown in (3') and (4').
4. For a good discussion of lag operators see Griliches
(1 967).







Finally,for purposes of future discussion I take the first
difference of equation (3') and present it as equation (3").
AmY = [i)(LjA(L)a+B(L)A1nM (3")
-B(L)Av+D(L)Au].
2.2 The Poole Approach
Inapair of pathbreakinqarticles, Poole (1970a, 1971)
analyzedthe question of whether the authorities should use
the interesb rate or the money supply as their instrument,
given a target level of income, YT, and known parametersof
equa: (1) and (2).6 it is easily shown that,if there
were nc random errors, then it would not matter inthe least
which one was used. As can be seen in Figure 1, Chart A, the
appropriate setting of the interest rate (denoted as RT)is
that which intersects the IS curve at YT; similarly the
appropriate setting of the money supply is that which causes
the LM curve to intersect the IS curve at YT.
6. For an analysis of policy setting when parameters arenot
known with certainty, see Brainard (1967).Figure 1
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However,when error terms are assumed to shift the IS
curve and/or the UI curve in ways that cannot be directly
observed, the choice of instrument wi.l1 have substantive
implications for the economy. This can be seen intuitively in
the two polar cases usually focused on in this type of
discussion.7 In one the LM curve is stable (v =U)and the
IScurve shifts (Chart B)in the other the IS curve is stable
(u =0)arid the UI curve shifts (Chart C). In Chart B the IS
curve is assumed to shiftbetweenIS1an 152 andthe UI curve
isstable. If the authorities set R at RT, income will
fluctuate betwcen Y1 and Y2. On the other hand if M is set at
MT (giving IT when IS is at it normal IS0 position) then
income will fluctuate on'y between 13 and 14. Obviously in
this case the authorities should set M and let R fluctuate,
and monetary policy will act as an automatic stabilizer of
econom fluctuations.
Nc uppose instead that, as the demand for money shifts,
the LM curve fluctuates between LM1 and LM2 and the IS curve
is stable. s shown in Chart C, setting the money supply at
MT will lead to shifts in income between 11 and If the
authorities set the interest rate at RT, income will remain
unchanged at YT regardless of the movements of the LM curve.
Thus the intuition to be qained from Poole is that the
authorities should use the money supply as an instrument
7. See Poole (1970a, 1971) and LeRoy and Lindsey (1978).— 11—
ifthe IS curve is volatile and the rMcurveis stable, and
the interest rate as an instrument if the demand for money is
volatile and the IS curve is stable.8
Poole extends the analysis to deal with the more general
case in which both curves shift and their shifts can he
positively or negatively correlated with each other. One can
ue equations (3) and (5) to calculate the variance of income
around its target level when M or R are set at MT or RT to
achieve YT for u =v=0.Minimization of income variance,
the criterion for choice between M and R as instrument,
involves comparing expressions that contain the variance of u,
the variance of v, and the covariance between them as well as
the coefficients d, h, and e. The amount of information
required to implement this approach is thus rather substantial
since one has to know the size of error variances and
covariances and the crucial structural parameters of the
system. Further, if this knowledge is available, one can
carry out short—run fine tuning in response to any known shift
in any of the exogenous variables of the system. For example,
if the aggregate expenditure curve shifted upward (upward
shift in a(t)), this model indicates that M should be reduced
so as to offset the increase in Y that would occur if policy
8. If the demand for money were volatile in the very short
run, say over a week, hut quite stable over the longer
run, say over six months, the analysis would imply
emphasis on interest rates in the very short run and on
the money supply in the longer run.— 12—
wereleft unchanged. Similarly in the extension to a system
with lags, a change in an exogenous variable whose effect was
expected to persist for more than one period would likely
entail a series of offsetting changes over time in the policy
instrument, whether M or R.9
This activist element in the formal Poole approach can
also be interpreted in terms of the indicator or information
role of financial variables in the absence of complete
information.0 Suppose, for example, that both the money
supply numbers and interest rate data areavailable with
virtually no lag but that GNP data are availablewith only a
substantial lag. One cannot use equations (1) and (2) to
deduce the values of u or v in the period in which they occur
because the value of Y is not available. The problem then
becomes one of trying to use the information contained in
movements of the financial variables M and R, as well as
9.Poole himself clearly points out the implied activist
nature of his model in the section entitled "A Dynamic
Model" in Poole (1970a).It is rather curious that his
approach has become associated with the notionof a
passive setting of the instruments of policy, aresult
that holds only in the simple static version of the
theory. The other element of the Poole approachthat has
usually been neglected in later discussionsis the
"combination policy" in which the central bank in effect
calculates a money supply rule that is generally superior
to the constant R or the constant M policydiscussed
above.
10. A formal analysis of the problem that has beencouched in
these terms can be found in Kareken, Muench and Wallace
(1973) and in Friedman (1975). For a simplediagrammatic
analysis of the role of the information variable, see
Mitchell (1980).— 13—
knowledgeof past behavioural and stochastic relationships, in
order to act in such a way as to minimize the variance of Y
over time. Thus, in an economy with a volatile IS curve and a
stable demand for money, an incipient increase in M will
inform the observer that the [S curve has shifted to the right
and hence that monetary policy should be tightened (Rup or M
down). On the other hand, in an economy with a stable IS
curve and a volatile money demand, an incipient increase in N
will indicate a random increase in money demand and hence will
entail an increase in money supply (i.e., P constant). With
bothIS and LM curves volatile, knowledqe of past variances
and covariance of theerrorLeri u and vwill be needed to
deduce the optimal policy that will minimize the variance of
income. 1 1
The literature derivin from the Poole approach has
branched in two directions. The first deals with the question
of whether the authorities should use reserves or interest
rates as their instrument, in aiming at the money supply
intermediate target.12 This has in turn led to an
examination of the logic of a two—stage procedure in which,
11. Note the implicit assumption in this analysis that there
can be substantial deleterious effects on income from not
adjusting the policy settings over the period in which
the income data are unavailable. There exists research
in Canada indicating that a less—than—optimal setting of
the instruments for short periods of time has only
relatively small effects on the economy. See Duquay and
Jenkins (1978).
12. See Pierce and Thomson (1972).— 14—
say,interest rates are used to aim at money and money to aim
at income (Friedman (1975, 1977a)), and of the general role of
information in setting policy (Kareken, Muench, and Wallace
(1973), Friedman (1975)).13 The second extension has been to
add an external sector to the model and examine the role of
exchange rates in the analysis (Henderson (1979), Boyer
(1978), Sparks (1979)). Since exchange rate data are also
available with virtually no lag, one can treat the exchange
rate as a possible intermediate target or as an information
variable.
2.3 The Reduced—Form Approach
The second approach to monetary targeting is based on the
reduced—form analysis of the effects of the money supply on
income. Equations (1) and (2) can he solved to give Y as a
function of M as shown above in equation (3). However, since
the reduced—form model has empirically been implemented in
terms of a distributed lag model, it makes more sense to
derive it in terms of equations (1') and (2') that allow for
lags. As shown in equation (3'), Y can be written as a
distributed laq on M, u and v, and in a more general model on
any shift in a(t) caused by, for example, changesin taxes,
13. This strand of the literature has shifted the focus of
attention away from the optimal instrument towards the
question of how new information should be used. One
conclusion of these articles is that all available
information should be looked at in the setting of policy.— 15—
governmentexpenditures, or exports.14 If equation (3') is
first—differenced, we have the more usual St. Louis type of
equation with nominal income growth written as a function of
the growth of money as shown in equation (3").
An equation such as (3!) is sometimes used as the basis
for the argument that if the growth of money is held stable
then the growth of income will he stable.15 The emphasis on
the reduced—form equation (3w) rather than on the structural
equations (1') and (2!) 'erives from the belief that it is
much more difficult empirically tocapturethe IS curve
directly than it is to capture it indirectly via equation
(31).16 The reasons for this belief range from the
difficulty of finding appropriate measures for all the
interest rates entering into the determination of consumption
and investment to the possibility that money has a direct
effect on expenditure that cannot be encompassed easily in an
equation such as (1 ') butwhose effect on income will show up
in a reduced—form equation.17 It is worth noting in
14. The seminal article on reduced—form models is Anderson
and Jordan (1968). For the application of such models to
Canada see Duguay (1978).
15. In a non—inflationary, non—growth world the argument
would be couched in terms of levels of money and levels
of income.
16. One of the conditions necessary for equation (3") to fit
well is that Av be small relative to A1nM, i.e., that the
demand for money be reasonably well defined.
17.In Section 3.3 I discuss some empirical problems related
to the estimation of reduced—form models.— 16—
connectionwith this approach that if equation (3') or (3")
were really well specified one could implement a counter—
cyclical activist policy in which changes in money growth
rates were used to offset exogenous shifts in expenditureand
other shocks to the system.18 Despite the inherent logic of
this point, believers in reduced—form models tend to oppose
the use of monetary policy for countercyclical purposes.
2.4 The Feedback—Rule Approach
In a third approach9 to monetary targeting, interest
rates are set on the basis of a tendency of money growth to
diverge from its target growth path.2° Thus if money
incipiently grows faster than desired, the authoritieswill
raise interest rates and this will push money back down to its
18. See White (1978).
19. Although I treat the feedback rule as a separate
approach, one might consider it as an offshoot of the
Poole approach to policy in which attention is focused on
th polar case in which, over the medium run, the LM
curve is relatively stable and the IS curve isvolatile.
The principal additional elements in this approach are
(a) the assumption that the authorities do not knowthe
parameters of the IS curve and hence cannot implement an
activist policy and (h) the attention paid to practical
problems such as the means of avoiding instrument
instability.
20. In the implementation of this approach, theauthorities
are likely to use a fan or band around the target growth
path and change interest rates only when moneymoves
outside the fan or the band. However, for expositional
purposes I ignore the subtletiesconnected with the use
of a fan or band.- 17—
target.21Conversely, when money incipiently grows more
slowly than desired, the authoriLies will reduce interest
rates and this will tend to raise money back to its target.
There are two variants of this approach. In the ficst
and less interesting the authorities act to hold M equa to
its target regardless of whether the source of the increase in
morley demand is a random ;hift in money demand or an undesired
increase in income. In the second variant the authorities set
targetmoney growth equal ttarqet income qrowth (A1nYT )22
timesthe appropriate elasticity plus (less) any random
increase (decrease) in money demanded that can he identified.
I-ience it is only undesired increases in income that give rise
to interest rate changes.
In the simple static model described above, this approach
can he formalized by setting money supply at its target level,
MT, in equation (2), first-differencing, and transposing
terms. This gives
AR=[eAlnY+Av—AInMT1 (7)
21.Note that there is no independent role for the money
supply in this approach. The authorities use interest
rate changes to move along the money demand curve and
money demand is assumed always to equal money supply. In
the very short run the authorities use the setting of
excess cash reserves at the chartered banks to influence
short—term interest rates. See Dingle, Sparks, and
Walker (1972) and White and Poloz (1980) for a detailed
discussion of the technique of setting excess cash
reserves by the Bank of Canada.
22. This would he zero in a completely static model.— 18—
Theformalization of the second variant of the policy rule
discussed in the preceding paragraph is shown as equation (8).
A1nMT =eA1nYT+Av. (8)
Substituting (8) into (7) we have
AR =[AmY-A1nYT]. (9)
Thus the money rule can be shown to be formally equivalent to
a feedback rule on income growth. When income grows faster
than desired, interest rates are increased and when income
grows more slowly than desired, interest rates are
decreased.23 This policy can be treated as a form of
23. Given the formal equivalence of a feedback rule on money
growth and another on income growth, one might wonder why
the authorities do not dispense with the intermediate
money tarqet and focus solely on a nominal income
target. Indeed, this approach has been suggested by
Tobin (1980). There are, however, good reasons for
continuing to use an intermediate money target. In a
world with lags the change in interest rates resulting
from the movement of income away from its target will
cause income to return to its target but only with a long
lag. The same change in interest rates is likely to
cause money to return to its tarqet much more quickly
especially if the intermediate target is a narrow
monetary aggregate, because both the movement of income
back to its target and, as a separate factor, the change
in interest rates, act in the same direction on money
growth. The argument has often been made that it is
important, both from the standpoint of the credibility of
the authorities and as a means of ensuring their
accountability, to choose a target that can be achieved
within a reasonable horizon. Money fulfils this role
whereas nominal income does not. An additional factor in
reducing the usefulness of nominal income as a target is
the large revisions that have taken place over the years
between the preliminary national accounts data and the
final numbers.19 —
proportionalstabilization rule of the sort discussed by
Phillips (1954) in his classic article. Note that for the
policy to make sense one must assume that there exists an IS
equation such as that depicted in equation (1) in which an
increase in interest rates tends to reduce the demand for
goods but that the authorities do not know the values of the
parameters of this equaticn,24 Hence the authorities dc not
have sufficient knowledge t calry out an activist
countercyclical policy in the face of an exoqenous shift in
the demand for goods.
In implementing the feedback policy the authorities are
continually faced with the question of whether an increase in
actual money has been caused by an increase in Y (the data for
which are unavailable because of the lag in producing the
numbers) or by a random movement in the demand for money, v.
In the first case interest rates should he raised; in the
second, they should not he raised and the money supply target
should be adjusted to accommodate the random movement. All
available information, both real and financial, should be
brought to bear in order to distinguish between the two
hypotheses.
In the case of lags in the economic system, as depicted
by equations (1') and (2'), there is a distinct possibility
24. Similarly, the authorities either do not possess or do
not believe in estimated reduced-form equations of the
sort shown in equations (3') or (3").— 20—
thatattempts to respond to increases in Y by forcing M back
to target in the very short run will lead to substantial
interest rate volatility and possibly to the explosive
oscillation in interest rates that has been termed instrument
instability (Holbrook (1972)). This can be shown by using
(2'), the LM curve with lags, to solve for the feedback rule.
AR = [E(L)A1nY+ Av -AInMT-D*(L)AR]. (71)
Here d0 is the lead coefficient in D(L), i.e., the coefficient
on current R, and n*(L) is the rest of the distributed lag
with d0 omitted. The movement of R in response to an increase
in income growth is thus determined by this nth order
difference equation in AR.If d0 is small relative to the
coefficients in the rest of D(L), there is likely to be
substantial volatility in interest rate movements when income
starts to grow faster than desired.25
25. The pattern will also depend on the lag structure of
E(L). Empirically the mean lag on income can he
estimated to be smaller than the mean lag on interest
rates. In these circumstances the assertion in the text
about volatility will hold true. It is worth pointing
out that the implied volatility in interest rates is the
result of the lag structure of the money demand equation
and not of the choice of interest rates rather than money
as the instrument. If the authorities held money
constant in the face of an increase in income the same
interest rate pattern would result as that indicated by
equation (7'). Diagrammatically, this can he shown by
the movement of the short—run LM curve in response to
past interest rate changes in the presence of long lags.
See Meyer (1974).— 21—
Theway out of this difficulty is to use interest rates
to bring the money supply back to its target level, not each
period (e.g., month) but at the end of a period of, say, six
months (White (1976)), This 'ill result in the money supply
being away from its taLqet tor a period of time; howejer, the
interest rates will always be acting in the direction of
moving it back towards the taqet.
2.5 Summary
The above analysis ot e Lhree approaches to setting
targets for monetary aqgrecates can be summarized as follows.
The formal Poole approach rdmostof its offshoots require
knowledge of the parameters and error variances and
covariances of boththeIS and LM curves. The approach
focuses on the period wheninformationonincomeis
unavailable, indicates the way in which information can be
used, and implies short—run fine tuning as information becomes
available. The reduced-form approach requires knowledge of
the reduced—form equation in which nominal income is a
function of money hut does not require knowledge of the
underlying structural equations. Logically, it can be used to
justify fine tuning in response to shifts in exogenous
expenditures. The feedback—rule approach, which can be
treated as an extension of one of the polar cases of the Poole
approach, requires knowledge of the parameters of the LM curve
but not the parameters of the IS curve. It qives the— 22—
authoritiesa rule for changing interest rates as money moves
away from target but requires a judgment as towhether the
source of the change in money is a random shift in the demand
curve for money or an increase in income.It: doesnot entail
an activist monetary policy since the information is not
available to implemert such a policy.— 23—
3MONETARY POLICY IN A MODEL WITH INFLATION
In this section I examine the logic of a monetary
aggregates target and the implications of implementing a
policy of reducing the rate of growth of the monetary
aggregate in a model of a world with inflation. The model
used in this section of the paper, although still very simple,
represents in a not unreasonable way the thinking of many
mainstream economists about the inflationary process.
Although the model reflects a closed economy, extension to an
open economy is not difficult and will be discussed in
footnotes.
3.1 The Model
The model has four equations: the income—expenditure
relation (IS), the money market equilibrium (LM), the
augmented Phillips curve with a natural rate interpretation,
and the expectations—formation equation:
lnQ =A(L)a-B(L)(R_(/.1flP)e) + (10)
lnM =c-D(L)R+E(L)lnQ+F(L)lnP+v (11)
AmP =(AlP)e+G(L)(lnQ-1nQF) +w (12)
(AlflP)e =H(L)A1nP+z. (13)
Equation (10) relates real output (Q) to the real
interest rate defined as the nominal interest rate minus the— 24—
expectedrate of inflation.26 In equation (11) the demand
for money is a function of real output, the price level and
the nominal interest rate. For both theoretical and empirical
reasons, I assume F(1) =1;i.e., in the long run a doubling
of the price level leads to a doubling of the quantity of
money demanded. In equation (12), the augmented Phillips
curve,27 the rate of inflation is equal to the expected rate
of inflation plus a function of the difference between output
and full—employment output (QE'). This equation is equivalent
to the usual relationship between inflation, unemployment, and
expected inflation since ln(Q/QF) is linearly related to the
difference between actual unemployment and the natural rate.
In the way it has been specified, the equation implies a
linear relation between unemployment and inflation whereas
many empirical studies have found a non—linear relation—
ship.28 For analytical convenience I will use the linear
formu1't ion but will point out in passing the circumstances
where the non—linearity would make a difference to the
analysis. Finally, equation (13) relates the expected rate of
26. In a more sophisticated model one might use a long—term
interest rate in equation (10) and a short—term rate in
equation (11).
27. Usually the Phillips curve is defined in terms of wages.
If one assumes that prices are determined by marking up
wages (or standard unit labour costs) one can easily
derive equation (12) by solving out the wage Phillips
curve and the mark—up equation.
28. See, for example, Freedman (1976).— 25 —
inflationto past rates of iiflation.ThisfoLniuiation rules
out both rational expectations29 and the possibility that the
announcement of polic' may have a direct effect on expec-
tations.30 In equation (13) itisassumed that H(1) i;31
thisassumption is necesar:y tor the model to have bug—run
natural rate properties.32
BeforeI go on to anovzethe properties ot the above
model, I present the teduced—forn equations that car be
derived from equations (10) to (1 3) .Thethrue that are
needed for future nalyis show the reJationsiip between money
supply growth and the rate of inflation, the rate of growth of
output,and the growth ofnominal income.
AmP =IJ(L) j A1nM+A(L)Aa] + errorteis (14)
29.See, however, Friedman (1979) for discussion of the
possibility that truly rational expectations are really
adaptive after all.
30. See footnote 41 for further discussion of this point.
31. Note, however, the arguments against this hypothesis in
Sargent (1971).
32. A simple way of introducing the exchange rate into the
above model is to postulate that the level of the
exchange rate is a function of the level of prices in
Canada vis—à—vis the level of prices in foreign
countries, especially the United States, and of the
differential in the real interest rate between Canada and
foreign countries. A more realistic analysis of the
determinants of the Canadian dollar can be found in Haas











Given that F(1) and H(1) are assumed to equal 1 the sum of the





Thu; in the long run the rate of inflation and the rate
of growth of nominal income will be equal to the rate of
growth of money. The role of the exogenous expenditure term,
a, is easy to interpret in economic terms. Only if the real
value of automonous expenditures rises continually can it have
a permanent effect on inflation. But in a non-growth model
with QF constant it is impossible to envisage such a situation
occurring.— 27-
3.2Effects of a Deceleration
in Money Supply Growth
I begin the analysis o the above model by assuming that
the economy is experiencing a persistently high rate of
inflation (say 8 per cent and thetpriorityisgivento
bringing down the rate of inflation to a much lower rat: (say
2 per cent). There are two maintypesof decelerationay
pathsthat might he considered:(1 ) a gradual reduction in
the targeted rate of growth :money(instrument gradualism);
(2) a sharp reduction inthe targeted rate of growth of money
(instrument cold shower).33 if che preferred policy is to be
one of gradualism, it is ao necessary to specify how gradual
the policy is to be, ie., how many years will be required to
achieve the final target of 2 per cent. growth in the money
supply. The choice among theoptionswilldependin large
part on the movements of outhut, prices, and interest rates
(also the exchange rate) that are expected to result from the
policy implemented by the anthorities. The movement of these
variables is basically an empirical question and hence one
must have recourse to empirical models in order to get some
feel for the kinds of results that can be expected from
different policies. I first examine the results of
implementing a policy of gradual deceleration of the money
33. One might also consider a gradual reduction in the rate
of inflation (goal gradualism) and a sharp reduction in
the rate of inflation (goal. cold shower). See Poole
(1970b) and Freedman (1978b) for a discussion of these
concepts.— 28—
supply(instrument gradualism) in an economy of the sort
depicted by structural equations (10) to (13), given plausible
estimates of the coefficients and lagstructures,and then
turnbriefly to the policy of a sharp reduction in the rate of
growth of money.34
Suppose one starts from a qrowt;h rate of money of, say,
8 per cent, and reduce: thl3 g(owLn rate by 1 percenraqe point
per annum for six ycurs until L':eaches a rate of 2 per cenr
consistent with the desired 2 per cent infiation The results
of such a deceleration are shor in.igure2 for interest
rates, price inflation, real output. and nominal income
growth.35 Clearly gradualism in bringing down the instrument
(money) leads to a cyclical pattern in all the endoqenous
variablesof the system. Nonetheless, theunderlying movement
ofall the nominal variables is downward; i.e., despite the
cyclical nature of the outcome, there is a clear downward
trend over time. The time paths portrayed in Figure 2
indicate, however, that a policy of instrument gradualism
34. A somewhat more complex model with an external sector was
developed in Freedman (1978a). This model, along with
some others, was subjected to a policy of decelerating
money supply growth in Freedman (1978b) and theresults
reported in that paper are the basis for the analysis of
this section. A similar analysis using an even simpler
model can be found in Tobin (1974). For a more recent
exercise of this sort see 4eyer and Rasche (1980).
35. I also graph 1nPFX, the exchange rate, based on the
equation sketched out in footnote 32.I assume that the
foreign inflation rate is constant at 2 per cent
throughout the entire period.— 29 —
Figure 2

























requirespatience since the decline in inflation rates is
initially rather small and some time is required before the
effects on inflation of the deceleracon policy become
sizable.
Whatare the economics inderiyinq these results? Given
the 8 per cent inflation rate, thedeclinein the rate of
growthof the money supply initially leads to a rise in
interest rates, With price inflition continuing at 8 per cent
this rise in nominal rates alsoimplies ariseinrealrates
ofinterest, which brings about &declinein real
expenditure.36 This in turn leads to a decline in output, an
increase in unemployment above the natural rate, and a
decrease in both wage and price inflation. The decrease in
price inflation feeds gradually into expected inflation,
putting further downward pressure on wage inflation, and so
on. In the course of the downward movement nominal interest
rates begin to fall after their initial rise; this occurs
first as a result of the decline in real income and later as a
result of the slowdown in the rate of price inflation. The
36. For a large model such as DX2, 'which has an external
sector, the explanation can be expanded in a number of
directions. The most important ones are the multifaceted
effect of real interest rates on expenditure via real
fixed investment, consumption, and housing, and the
effect of a rise in interest rates on the exchange rate.
The implied appreciation of the Canadian dollar leads to
a reduction of the real current account balance, thereby
accentuating the effects on real expenditure of the rise
in interest rates and also has a direct downward effect
on Canadian prices via its effect on the Canadian dollar
prices of traded goods. See Freedman and Lonqworth
(1975) for a detailed analysis of the monetary policy
mechanism in RDX2.— -1
interestrate finally settles at a new lower level that
reflects the reduced rate of inflation. Thus the model gives
rise to the three classic eftects of a money supply decline on
the nominal rate of interest s discussed, for example, by
Friedman (1968): the liquidiry effect (the initial rise in the
nominal interest rate), the inconie effect (the subsequent
decline as income falls) and h: iflatonary effect (to the
new level consistent with th.ower rote of inflation).
The existence of cycles c;ri thedownward pathfollowsfrom
thelags inherent in the syse described in the structural
equations (10) to (12) and those, in the expectations formation
equation (13). But what are tine irain determinants of the
characteristics of the cycle5resuitinq from the deceleration
inthe rate of growth of money? Whatdetermines peak
unemploymentrates and speeds of response of inflation and
othervariables? ExperimenLs r:arriedout with a relatively
simplemodel that incorporats the characteristics of
equations (10) to (13) but ciisohasan international sector
(Freedman (1978a)) indicate thatthecharacteristics of the
wage—price sector are themost significant elements in the
development ofthe cyclical response of the economy.37 The
two crucial parameters ar€ th size and speed of the response
of prices to the product gap or of wages to the unemployment
37.Themagnitude of these:iti—elasticity of the demand for money
withrespect to the interest rate also plays a role in deter—
mininqwhether or notthe modelis stable.— 32—
gap)and the mean lag in expectations formation. The greater
the response of inflation to economic slack and the shorter
the mean lag on expectations formation, the smaller the peak
unemployment rate associated with any given path of money
supply deceleration. It is interesting to note that it is not
so much the path of inflation that changes when coefficients
are altered as the paths of real output and employment. These
move in such a way as to bring about the price deceleration
consistent with the deceleration of the rate of growth of the
money supply.38
There is a further important characteristic of the
decelerationary path that is worth stressing at this point.
Since the nominal rate of interest will decline eventually in
response to the decline in the rate of inflation, there will
be an increase in the demand for real money balances. To
satisfy this increase, the rate of price inflation must
decelerate somewhat faster on averaqe than the rate of nominal
money supply growth. For example, consider a case in which
the money supply growth rate was reduced 1 percentage point
per year for six years (from 8 per cent to 2 per cent) and
interest rates fell from 12 per cent to 6 per cent over this
same period.If the semi—elasticity of demand for money
38. See Freedman (1978b) for the analysis summarized in this
paragraph. The importance of the two coefficients is
also emphasized in Freedman (1977).33 —
withrespect to interest rates (the coefficient d in equation
(2)) was about real balances would have to rise by
[(12—6) x 0.02] or 12 per cent over the period. To achieve
this rise, the average rate ofinflation wouldhave to be2
per cent less than the averaje rate of growth of the money
supply over the Six—year period, Since initially the growth
ofthe money supply falls rioce hacidoesprice inflation
(implying an initial fall in moneybalances),at some
laterpoint in the cycle pe ifiaton would have to be
decelerating substantially f:t than the money supply in
order to permit the necessary crowtb of real moneybalances.
Withoutsuch an "overshoot" l inflation rates, the amount of
realmoney balances at the nd of the six—year period of money
supply deceleration would be lower than needed in long—run
equilibrium. This insufficiency would result in higher
interest rates arid thus lead to theonsetof secondary cycles
despite the fact that the more growth rate had stopped
declining. To prevent such a situation from arising, policy
might allow for an increase in the level of money balances
once and for all (but not in their rate of growth) in order to
Supply the economy ith the ceal balances demanded at
39. This would correspond to an elasticity of 0.24 at 12 per
cent interest rates and 0.12 at 6 per cent interest
rates.— 34—
thenew equilibrium lower rates of interest.40
The system of equations under discussion can also be used
to compare the merits of instrument gradualism and instrument
cold shower as a policy response to inflationary conditions.
Because of the lags in the economic system, both types of
policy give rise to cyclical movements in the key economic
variables. But a cold—shower policy involving a sharp decline
in the rate of growth of the money supply (say a permanent
decline from 8 per cent to 2 per cent in one year) would lead
to a much sharper initial cycle than that portrayed in
Figure The far sharper initial increases in interest
rates and unemployment rates that would result from such a
policy might be considered a less desirable outcome than that
40. A detailed theoretical discussion of this point can be
found in Freedman (1978c).
41.If the announcement of a cold—shower policy had direct
effects on expectations this Oonclusion would be
substantially modified. Fellner (1976, 1979) has
enunciated the credibility hypothesis in which he argues
that the expectations that enter into the decision making
of the private sector can be strongly affected by the
policy announced by the authorities, to the extent that
the authorities have gained credibility by achieving
previously announced targets. Fellner argues that
estimated lags overstate the true lags in such a case and
hence gi'7e an overly pessimistic picture of the
difficulty in brinqing down the rate of inflation. There
may be some merit to the argument offered byFeliner
although very little empirical evidence has been
presented to support the approach. Lucas (1976) has also
argued that estimated structural coefficients will change
in response to a change in policy and that simulated time
paths in response to policy shocks should take this into
account, thereby modifying the conclusions. The
practical importance of these roints remains an open
question.- 35—
achievedby a gradualist policy in spite of the more rapid
decline in inflation.42
Furthermore, and perhaps more important, empirically
wages and prices have generally been found to be more closely
related to thereciprocalof the unemployment rate than to its
level. This implies that theincreasein the unemployment
rate resultinq from a sharp cold—shower decline in the rate of
growthof the money supply would he larger than that implied
by a cold—shower policy inasystem with a linear Phillips
curve.The reason for this result is that with a non—linear
Phillips curve the extra deflationary effect on prices arising
from a given increase in unemployment is less, the higher the
unemployment rate; hence, to get an extra 1 percentage point
decline in the rate of inflation requires a larger increase in
the unemployment rate. Thus the argument against cold—shower
policies, which rests on the resulting excessively large
movements of interest rates and the unemployment rate (also
the exchange rate), gains' dded strength if the Phillips curve
is non—linear.
The principle underlying the choice of an appropriate
period of time over which to implement a policy of
42. A further element that is important in the real world but
not in the model is the existence of long—term
contracts.If many people have locked themselves into
such contracts it will he more costly to bring down the
rate of inflation very quickly. For example, long—term
borrowers who are paying high nominal rates of interest
would incur a substantial loss if the rate of inflation
fell dramatically as a result of a cold—shower policy.— 36—
decelerationis not very different from that underlying the
choice between instrument gradualism and instrument cold
shower. The shorter the period chosen, i.e., the greater the
rate of deceleration of the money supply, the sharper (at
least initially) will he the movements of the interest rate
and the unemployment rate (and also the exchange rate). On
the other hand, the decline in the rate of price inflation
will also be more rapid in the case of a more rapid rate of
deceleration of the money supply. Views regarding the desired
speed of deceleration would be based on judgments of the
desirability of the implied paths of inflation, unemployment,
etc., of the sort that have been presented above.
3.3 The Three Interpretations
of a Money Supply Rule
In the light of the above discussion I now return to the
three approaches to monetary targeting of Section 2 and
analyze them in terms of implementing an anti—inflationary
policy.
The Poole approach, which focuses on the short—run
unobservable shifts in IS and LM curves, cannot deal with
strategic problems such as the appropriate rate of
deceleration of the money supply. It can help only in dealing
with tactical problems that arise on the deceleration path,
such as the use of money and interest rates as information
variables that indicate the growth of nominal income in the
period before the income data become available.— 37—
Byway of contrast, both the reduced—form approach and
the feedback—rule approach can be used to address the
strategic questions that arise in the course of implementing
an anti—inflationary monetary policy. In the reduced—form
model (equations (14) to (16)) one solves for the growth of
real output, inflation, and nominal income as distributed lags
on past growth of the money supply as well as other
variables. The estimated coefficients that appear in
regressions based on these kinds of equations for Canada tend
to imply relatively small output cycles and a fairly rapid
decline in price inflation in response to a deceleration in
the growth rate of money.43 Given this result even
cold—shower policies or a policy of very rapid deceleration of
money can be justified in that the unemployment rate needed to
put downward pressure on inflation rates is not very large.
Moreover, virtually no secondary cycles appear in the
simulation of reduced—form models, in contrast with simulation
results from the system of structural equations.44
43. See Anderson and Jordan (1968) and Duguay (1978) for
standard reduced—form models explaining nominal income
and Selden (1977) for an equation explaining the rate of
inflation. See Freedman (1978b) for the paths of
variables such as unemployment and inflation that arise
from a deceleration of money in the Duguay model and in a
simple reduced—form equation for inflation.
44. See Meyer and Rasche (1980) for a similar comparison of
structural and reduced form models in the United States.
Dewald (1980) finds substantially higher unemployment
rates along the deceleratioriary path in his version of
the St. Louis model.— 38—
Thereduced—form type of analysis, however, does have two
main drawbacks.First, there is a long literature on the
empirical problems inherent in estimating the reduced—form
model that at the very least suggests caution about the
conclusions.45 Second, the empirica1 results in virtually
all estimated reduced—form models are inconsistent with the
underlying building block of a stable demand—for--money
function. This point is closely related to the argument made
above that if the rate of growth of the money supply is
reduced by one percentage point, not only does inflation
eventually have to fall by one percentage point in the long
run, but at. some intermediate point the rate of inflation must
temporarily fa3.i by more than one percentage point to permit
real money balances to rise by the amount needed to satisfy
demand at the lower oominal interest rate in the new
equilibrium. It can be shown46 that for this result to
occur, the coefficients on the distributed lag in the
regress ons of inflation and of nominal income growth on money
growth must fulfil two conditions. The sum of the
coefficients must be one, and the mean lag must be equal to
the value of the semi—elasticity of the demand for money with
respect to interest rates, i.e. —D(1). This in turn entails
that a series of negative coefficients follow the positive
45.See, for example, Davis (1969), Friedman (1977b),
Modigliani and Ando (1976), and Wurzburger (1978).
46. See Freedman (1978c).— 39—
coefficientsin the distributed lag. Whether because of the
empirical difficulty of finding such a pattern, or because of
the tendency to truncate distributed lags too early, or
because of the fact that it was not obvious to researchers
that such negative coefficients are required for theoretical
reasons, one does not typically find such patterns in the
empirical literature. Hence the reduced--form models as
estimated are not consistent with the standard demand—for—
money equation and this throws some doubt on the usefulness of
the results.
The feedback rule once again assumes that one can place
more confidence in the estimates of the demand—for—money
equation than in the empirical estimates of the other
equations. It is further assumed that one believes firmly in
the existence of the relationships expressed in equations
(10), (12) and (13) without being confident of the magnitude
of the coefficients and lags or the exact specification of the
equations. Thus one can make statements with some degree of
confidence about the long run——such as that a decelerating
path for money will eventually reduce the rate of price
inflation——without necessarily being clear in advance about
the time paths of the variables that are of interest over the
short to intermediate run.
The argument for gradualism in this context is in the
main based on the view thatknowledgeabout the detailed
structure of the economy is rather limited.In implementing a— 40—
policyof gradually reducing the rate of qrowth of the money
supply, a relatively rapid decline in prices might be achieved
with only a small decrease in output if the coefficients in
G(L) were large and if the mean lags on G(L) and H(L) were
small. The same policy would lead to a rather sharp decline
in output and only slow progress initially on price inflation
if these conditions did not hold. A reasonably cautious
approach to policy would therefore suggest a fairly gradual
deceleration with periodic reexamination of the results to see
if the outcome is roughly consistent with one's prior beliefs
about the non—monetary side of the economy. For example, if
unemployment rose substantially more (less) than expected and
inflation fell less (more) than expected this would imply,.
other things being equal, that the coefficients in G(L) and
H(L) were less (more) favourable to a rapid decline in
inflation than originally believed. This in turn would
suggest a slower (faster) rate of deceleration of the money
supply than originally intended or accepting higher (lower)
amounts of economic slack than originally intended. The logic
of a periodic retargeting rather than an initial announcement
of the entire money supply path thus derives mainly from the
uncertainty regarding the non—financial side of the economy
and the need to take into account in setting policy any new
information that becomes available regarding the response of
the economy to the changes in financial variables brought
about by the monetary deceleration.— 41—
4SELECTION OF A MONETARY AGGREGATE
There has been much debate in the past five years over
the question of which monetary aggregate the central bank
ought to use for targeting purposes.47 It is worth
emphasizing that the criteria for choice differ according to
the approach to monetary aggregates one is taking.
In the reduced—form approach the preferred aggregate is
the one whose movements b±5t explain future movements in
nominal income.48 Duguay (1978) has shown that in the case
of Canada Ml is the preferred measure from this point of
view. If one adopts the feedback-rule approach to policy,
then the best aggregate is the one that gives rise to the most
desirable movements of output, interest rates, exchange rates,
etc.49 White (1979) has argued strongly that Ml is the
preferred monetary aggregate from this standpoint also. The
arguments for targeting on the narrow monetary aggregate in
Canada are buttressed by the fact that Ml is at least as
stable as the broader aggregates and less susceptible to
shifts arising from unpredictable movements among financial
47. See, for example, Courchene (1976, 1979) and White
(1979).
48. It is also necessary to take account of the control-
lability of the money supply in choosing among the
aggregates.
49. The notion of most desirable movements should take into
account the desirability of avoiding the secondary cycles
discussed in Section 3.2.— 42—
instruments.Furthermore, the broader monetary aggregates
would return to a target path at about the same rate as would
nominal income following a shock to spending because of their
very low interest rate elasticity. In contrast, Ml would
return to its target path much more quickly than income
because of its relatively high interest rate elasticity. As
discussed above,50 the argument has often been made that this
is a desirable characteristic for a monetary target from the
standpoint of both the credibility and the accountability of
the authorities.
Using the Poole approach in a simple static model, one
can show that it the demand for money is perfectly stable the
authorities should set policy in terms of the monetary
aggregate that implies a vertical LM curve (i.e., that has
zero interest rate elasticity of demand); in such a case
shifts of the IS curve would not result in any change of
income. It would thus appear that a broader aggregate ought
to be preferred to Ml. However, even in a simple static
model, Poole has shown that if the demand—for—money equation
has any stochastic error attached to it "a small amount of
interest sensitivity is better than none" (Poole (1970a), page
206). Furthermore, once lags are added to the system one must
be concerned with the nature of the resulting time paths of
50. See footnote 23.— 43—
theendogenous variables. For example, if interest rates
affect the real economy only with a one—period lag (i.e., the
IS curve is vertical in the short run), then implementation of
a money target using an aggregate with zero interest rate
elasticity implies that no equilibrium exists in the short
run. Even if the IS curve had a negative slope in the short
run, adhering to a constant money supply target using an
aggregate with zero interest rate elasticity might imply
explosive oscillations in the interest rate if lagged interest
rates had a substantially larger effect on real expenditure
than did current interest rates.
The extension of the Poole approach to the question of
the information content of different economic variables
suggests that the authorities ought to pay most attention to
the aggregate that yields the most information about current
movements of income for which data are as yet not available.
It does not follow, however, that targets should be set in
terms of this or any other monetary aggregate (Friedman
(1975)).
As White (1979) has pointed out, many criteria have been
suggested as a basis of choice among monetary aggregates. The
various criteria reflect differences in the approaches to
policy. The choice of a monetary aggregate presupposes a
priori selection of one of the approaches to policy as the
preferred approach, or at least a weighting of the usefulness
of the three approaches. Many of the arguments regarding the— 44—
choiceof a monetary aggregate are at cross purposes because
the protagonists are implicitly or explicitly using different
policy approaches as the basis for analysis.— 45—
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